the GPA is supposed to be freely chosen by members to join, China undertook some obligations relating to government procurement. 4 So at the very beginning, China was not willing to accede to the GPA. China made these commitments just because of foreign pressure and coercion. This was considered a part of necessary costs to ensure the WTO membership. In comparison, joining the WTO was an ingenerate need for
China. The unwillingness of China's GPA accession directly results in the lack of political momentum on the negotiation.
In the Report of the Working Party, China committed itself to initiating negotiations for membership in the GPA by tabling an "Appendix 1 offer" "as soon as possible".
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This commitment makes it clear that China must accede to the GPA. But the timing is unclear somewhat. Taking advantage of this ambiguity, China had not delivered its application until the end of 2007, six years after joining the WTO. It is really not "soon". Besides, China has already undertaken the obligation of MFN of a GPA party.
In paragraph 339 of the Report of the Working Party, China commits to "providing all foreign suppliers with equal opportunity to participate in that procurement pursuant to the principle of MFN treatment". Actually, this commitment is even beyond the requirements of the GPA since the GPA just demands non-discrimination among the GPA parties rather than the WTO members.
Concerning the procurement of SOEs, China confirmed that "all laws, regulations and measures relating to the procurement by state-owned and state-invested enterprises of goods and services for commercial sale, production of goods or supply of services for commercial sale, or for non-governmental purposes would not be considered to be laws, regulations and measures relating to government procurement. Thus, such purchases or sales would be subject to the provisions of Articles II, XVI and XVII of the GATS and Article III of the GATT 1994." 6 This means that it is not necessary to include SOEs in GPA coverage, since they have already undertaken the obligation of national treatment. However, the GPA parties are not convinced by the commitment.
They are afraid that SOEs will submit to governmental requirements in some cases to secretly give preference to domestic products. If SOEs are listed under the regulation of the GPA, foreign suppliers at least can resort to challenge procedures or WTO dispute settlement mechanism to deter hidden discrimination from SOEs.
Nonetheless, including SOEs in GPA coverage will cause serious challenges in the negotiation. 7 First, Chinese SOEs are much diversified with different degrees of market-orientation. Even covered by the GPA, it is very difficult to distinguish between governmental and commercial procurement in an SOE. Secondly, the whole size of Chinese SOEs' investment and consumption is much larger than that of any country. Since GPA negotiation is based on strict reciprocity, it is almost impossible to find comparable sectors in incumbent parties as Chinese SOEs. As Trepte (2005) states, the negotiation on government procurement is not actually concerned about the scope or definition of it, but the reciprocity between offers of members. Thirdly, procurement of Chinese SOEs is currently outside the narrow definition of 'government procurement' provided by GPL. No state enterprises which just get away from governmental direct control would like to be administered by the government again because of joining the GPA. Therefore, the powerful state sector will become a natural opponent of GPA accession if parties insist on putting them under the coverage.
Disputes over government procurement with other members since WTO entry
Since the Government Procurement Law entered into force in 2002, all the levels of the Chinese government have been endeavoring to develop their own regulations and practices on their procurement. While the Tendering Law is focused on the procedural correctness and no particular policy implications, the Government Procurement Law clearly states that government procurement should be helpful to some social and economic objectives, including protecting environment, supporting ethnic minority and underdeveloped regions, promoting small and medium enterprises (Article 9).
Further, Article 10 requires government procurers to purchase domestic products. In this sense, the Government Procurement Law creates a new policy tool available for governments, which is certainly much welcome. In the early years after China's WTO entry, European and American attention paid to China's GPA commitment was relatively low. One reason is that the top priority with regard to China at that time was to make sure China implement its broader WTO commitments. Another is that the Chinese government did not take government procurement as a policy tool to support domestic industries and foreign companies were somewhat discriminated positively rather than negatively in Chinese government procurement. 12 As the government began to realize the value of government procurement in pursuing some industrial policy goals and to make some movements, foreign companies and governments subsequently and promptly resorted to China's commitment in its WTO package and pressed China to give up its initiative.
Of course, it would be the best way to integrate China into the GPA. Therefore, on the Chinese government is willing to implement its commitments, but reluctant to make new commitments. More importantly, the state plays a much more significant role in the Chinese economy than the state in other national economies, although the market-oriented reform has been implemented for more than 30 years. In recent years, the Chinese government has seemed to be more confident in its economic management in the context of financial crisis happening in Western market economies and revived its control over the economy. For example, Premier Wen Jiabao states in his work report that "We must be guided by realities in deciding when market forces are to play the greater role and when government control is to play the greater role".
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This actually means that the government still prevails over the market since the power of choice rests in the hands of the government. Therefore, the share of Chinese government procurement market in the whole market will continue to expand. This is certainly very attractive for all foreign suppliers.
Key elements of China's GPA accession negotiation
In essence, there is only one single problem with regard to China's GPA accession, which is what government procurement is. Neither the GATT 1994 nor the GPA has a clear-cut definition of government procurement. The GATT defines it as procurement for government purposes, but leaving what governmental purposes are unanswered.
GPA 1994 only specifies the contractual means of procurement. GPA 2007 just combines the above two approaches and develops a more comprehensive definition of government procurement, which is referred to any kinds of procurement by covered entities not for commercial purposes. Then the coverage of government procurement is subject to negotiation for each party. This was feasible because the current parties are mostly developed market economies. Government procurement is a kind of exception to the whole market, which is mostly for the consumption of government.
But in the case of China, the role of government is too large to be separated from the market. In fact, the government is a major investment and market entity in China. The state sector including SOEs and governments accounts for almost one third of the total fixed asset investment 19 , meaning that it is the single largest investor in China.
For example, Chinese Ministry of Railway is almost the only constructor of railways, investing thousands of billions Yuan in the recent years on developing the high-speed railway system. Only the Beijing-Shanghai High-speed Railway has cost 220 billion yYuan. Interestingly, in March 2011, the National Audit Office found that contracts worth more than 4 billion yuan were awarded without tendering.
20
Therefore, the role as an investor of various levels of Chinese government poses a serious challenge to the current GPA system. As an arguably weakest part of the world trading system, the GPA has no such appetite or ability to accommodate China with such a big state sector. It is also hard for the Chinese government to put its investment under the scrutiny of an international organization.
Besides, China's own government procurement regime is far away from consistent and coherent. According to GPL, "Government Procurement refers to all the purchasing activities with fiscal funds conducted by the state organs at all levels, public institutions and social organizations where the intended goods, construction and services are those listed in the Centralized Procurement Catalogue (CPC)
published by the procuring authority or those whose value exceeds the respective Prescribed Procurement Thresholds (PPT) for goods, construction or services." This is a very narrow definition. In terms of procuring entities, it excludes all state enterprises.
But the fact is that governmental investments are mostly conducted by specifically established SOEs. For example, China Three Gorges Corporation, a state-owned enterprise, was the nominal constructor and investor of the huge Three Gorges project.
Although the company was set up by the State Council, its procurement is not regulated by the GPL. As for procured items, it only covers those listed in the CPC or those with values above PPT. In particular, as for procuring funds, it only refers to the procurement using fiscal funds. This means even purchasing of covered procuring entities is not subject to GPL as long as it is not financed by fiscal funds. This limitation is quite problematic and even not viable whatsoever. In fact, almost all public entities including many governmental agencies have financial earnings other than fiscal grants. For example, a majority of the earnings of Chinese public hospitals are dependent on their semi-commercial activities such as drug sales and medical services. Fiscal funds from the Ministry of Health or local governments can only cover salaries of faculty and staff and some construction projects. The same situation happens in many public universities and schools. In reality, these public institutions (shiye danwei) are required by their supervising governmental agencies to or voluntarily follow the regulations of government procurement. Their procurement is also subject to public tendering by themselves or other designated centralized procuring entities. Usually these institutions will follow specific tendering regulations stipulated by their supervising agencies based on the Tendering Law. But they do not take this kind of procurement as government procurement but centralized procurement because their procuring funds are not from fiscal allocations. Therefore, they do not have to obey the rule of buying Chinese provided by GPL. In this regard, a majority of their procurement is not subject to the GPA.
The fragmented Chinese government procurement poses great challenge to its accession to the GPA. China's offer, it is still arguable whether if all its procurement is subject to GPA rules because its procurement using own funds other than fiscal budget does not have to obey Chinese government procurement regime, then having no obligations to follow GPA rules. The process of GPA accession negotiation will certainly help to clarify and integrate China's government procurement regime. But if China accedes to the GPA before these inconsistencies are resolved, the implementation will be greatly troublesome for the Chinese government. This at least shows that they are not certain about the impact of joining the GPA or they are not convinced of the necessity of it. So they do not want to express their opinion on the issue.
II. Lack of political momentum for China's GPA negotiation
economic and political terms. But its significance should not be underestimated either, especially its impact on the government and state sector. WTO rules are designed to restrict governmental intervention policies on market activities while the GPA directly regulates government's own activities. Once joining the GPA, the governmental autonomy in its consumption and investment will be greatly reduced. In the case of China, government-sponsored investment has been long considered a useful tool to induce and stimulate social investment. As a response to the 2008 financial crisis, the Chinese government launched a stimulus package of 4000 billion yYuan. Besides, if the SOEs are covered by the GPA, they will have to follow the government procurement rules. The influence is quite uncertain. The WTO accession has shown that market access and openness is not harmful to the Chinese economy. But the GPA accession is largely not an issue of market access but a major reform of the government and state sector.
For the Chinese government, it is desirable to take the opportunity of the GPA accession negotiations to streamline its government procurement regime. Since the state sector will still be very large in the foreseeable future, its procurement should be put under strict and transparent regulatory system to ensure value for money and free of corruption. In recent years, corruption in the area of tendering at various levels has been deteriorating. This is no good to the legitimacy of the Chinese government and is worth more attention. Although the direct benefits of GPA accession might not be so visible, the negotiating process could be at least an opportunity for the government to use foreign pressures to reform the current system.
It is a little strange that there has no systematic analysis on the benefits and costs of China's accession to the GPA. 24 One reason is that it is really difficult to estimate the 24 Wang Ping believes that the lack of such analysis partly results in the lack of political momentum paid to GPA Interestingly, the study also shows that the import penetration rate of Chinese public sector is 6.1%, higher than those of the US(4.6%) and Japan(4.7%), and a little lower than those of EU(7.5%) and Canada(6.9%) 26 . Shingal finds that despite the GPA, the proportions of services contracts awarded to foreigners have declined over time for Japan and Switzerland. 27 Therefore, the space of expanding foreign market through GPA accession for China seems quite limited.
Another big problem is that no one can give an accurate account of China's government procurement. This is partly due to the vague definition of government procurement in the GPL. Currently, the Ministry of Finance publishes the annual procurement statistics which however only cover procurement of central and local governments defined by the GPL. Meanwhile, the costs of GPA entry are so clear: the government will lose its discretion of choosing between government control and market force. While the government control over investment and consumption is considered as a vital tool to facilitate economic and social development, this cost of GPA accession seems too large to be accepted. In fact, the supporters in China believe the most significant benefit is to promote the reform and improvement of Chinese government procurement system.
Following the approach of the WTO accession negotiation, foreign pressures and international rules are taken as a tool to fight against domestic resistance and to establish a more market-oriented and open government procurement system. This argument made sense in the case of WTO accession. But at present, the Chinese economy is much stronger and the Chinese government is more confident in itself and its policies. It is difficult to prove the necessity and feasibility of adopting other norms.
Although the Chinese leadership is clearly aware of serious problems in Chinese government procurement, they do not think it is necessary to depend on foreign pressures to deal with this issue.
In addition, since China was very keen to enter the WTO at that time, its negotiating counterparts had sufficient leverage to compel China to accept some unreasonable 
III. Institutional and organizational limitations in China's GPA negotiation
Unlike WTO accession negotiation, the Chinese government does not establish an inter-ministerial coordination body on GPA negotiation. This partly reflects less emphasis paid to the issue. Therefore, the government needed to choose a ministry as a coordinating agency. The GPA is a plurilateral agreement under the WTO. In China, The group has been divided into seven sub-groups respectively on general issues, services procurement, goods procurement, construction procurement, SOE procurement, military procurement, and local government procurement. Each sub-group has its own research areas which basically cover three topics. The first is the scope and size of government procurement and its relevant regulations. The second is competitiveness of relevant industries and possible impact of GPA accession on those industries. The third is to make a proposal under Appendix 1 offer based on the previous research. The way of work has both advantage and disadvantage. The advantage is that it could increase enthusiasm and participation of relevant ministries and gather valuable information and inputs from them. The disadvantage is that it might make coordination more complicated since the relevant ministries will have more diversified ideas with the negotiation. Another problem with it is that research results and conclusions are rather sporadic and it is hard to integrate them into a single proposal. In particular, since researches are conducted by relevant procuring entities themselves, they are generally inclined to stress institutional difficulties and risks resulting from GPA accession although many of researches on competitiveness and economic impact are positive. Therefore, when the leadership and the coordinating agency have no firm or clear orientation on the negotiation, relevant participants tend to be negative or at best neutral since the GPA accession itself has no obvious benefits for them.
IV. Academic and public involvement in China's GPA negotiation
China is often considered an authoritarian state in which public opinion has little influence on the central policy-making process. However, if policymakers want to achieve a specific policy goal, they have to take into account public opinion and get support from the public, although they cannot make decision based on public opinion and they could use their power to manipulate it.
During China's WTO accession process, there were two or three times of GATT fever and WTO fever. Not only all levels of governments were mobilized to study WTO rules, but the Chinese public and academia actively participated in the discussions. It was reported that over 3000 kinds of WTO-related books were published during the few years around WTO accession. These discussions and researches were basically supportive of China's further opening-up and WTO accession. This was also used as an argument for Chinese leaders and MOFTEC to counter those opponents from industrial ministries.
Chinese academia, especially those in economics, basically took the supportive attitude toward WTO accession. Since the mid-1990s, Chinese economic scholars had adopted more western economic theory and approach. Many researches on national economic impacts of WTO accession were based on general equilibrium models which are destined to present positive overall effects of trade liberalization. Influential think tanks in China such as CASS and DRC had done some comprehensive studies on the impact of WTO accession on both economy-wide and industrial levels. While they found some industries were possibly subject to losses, their conclusion on the overall economic effects were always positive. This kind of conclusion was useful to retort industrial protectionism in the name of national interest. They also actively organized scholars to conduct more researches and propaganda activities. For example, Chief Negotiator Long Yongtu personally edited a set of books which were authored by a number of scholars from universities and research institutions.
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Public opinion on WTO accession was also favorable in general. The Chinese government managed to persuade the public that WTO accession was beneficial to them with cheaper imports and domestic products as well as more free choice. Also, the government successfully convinced the public that the overall growth of the economy would diffuse its benefits to everybody. As a result, although there was increasing nationalism in late 1990s in China, the public were largely positive on the decision to accede to the WTO.
For the Chinese negotiators, close academic and public involvement played a positive role in securing national support and facilitating domestic coordination. As for GPA accession negotiation, this kind of involvement could be also helpful and necessary. procurement system is and how it will be affected by joining the GPA, but might not be able to answer why it is beneficial and necessary for China to join the GPA.
It is understandable that government procurement has not gained much attention from academia. First, China's government procurement system has been developed just in the recent decade. Scholars need more time to accumulate their knowledge on this topic. In fact, because there have appeared a lot of problems in the operations of government procurement, most attention of government procurement scholars has been paid to addressing these technical issues. It seems too early to care about the GPA. Secondly, for those who focus on the WTO, trade policy and economics, the GPA is much less important than other issues such as the Doha Round, trade remedies, FTA. Most books on the WTO just neglect or touch on a little this plurilateral agreement. However, for the Chinese negotiators, it is necessary to pay more attention to support, stimulate, and foster academic research. MOF has an annual budget of tens of millions of yuan on GPA research. These funds are assigned to relevant agencies which will in turn organize their own teams. Most of funds go to those institutions supervised by the agencies. Although some outside scholars are also invited into these teams, the research circle is still very limited.
In contrast, the public have been paying close attention to government procurement.
The primary reason is simply that there are too many corruption cases taking place in big public projects. It is widely reported that many officials manipulate tendering procedure to award contracts to those who bribe them. Almost all malfeasants are involved in backroom transactions relating to project tendering. 37 The most recent example is Liu Zhijun who was the Minster of Railways. Besides, the public care about government procurement because they are affected by its inefficiencies and deficiencies directly, especially those working in governments and public institutions.
Therefore, the public woule be happy to see a more transparent and efficient system put in place. However, they are not aware of the GPA accession negotiations and their positive effects on improving government procurement regime because of little coverage of this issue in media.
In comparison to WTO accession, the Chinese academia and public are much less mobilized in the case of GPA accession. Their support might not be indispensable for the negotiators, but would undoubtedly be very helpful. The negotiators should try their best to activate academic and public participation in the negotiation and seize the legitimacy to counter domestic resistance.
V. Conclusion
Joining the GPA is an important action of China's further integration into the world trading system following WTO accession. Though its economic and political significance is not comparable to that of WTO accession, it is still very helpful for China to construct a transparent, open, and efficient government procurement regime.
The accomplishment of China's WTO accession negotiation partly depended on good organization of the process. In particular, the negotiators successfully managed to mobilize supportive actors ranging from top leaders to public to overwhelm strong domestic opposition. But in the case of GPA negotiation, the negotiators have not 37 It is reported that during September 2009 to March 2011, 15010 government officials were found involved in corruption crimes related to construction project tendering. See "Hidden rules in governmental projects", South Weekend, August 4, 2011. http://www.infzm.com/content/61517 [2011/8/4 17:11:24] expended enough effort to form a wide and strong constituency in favor of GPA accession. The greatest restraint on GPA accession is the lack of attention and support from the Chinese leadership. This is largely due to the nature of GPA accession itself.
But another reason is that the significance is underestimated. China takes a different coordination mechanism and chief negotiator in GPA negotiation. This change has seemed to make negative difference on the proceeding of the negotiation as well as the possible results. An obvious lower-level coordination body is not powerful enough to eliminate even larger divergence among relevant ministries and actors. Also, without sufficient resources in expertise and authority, it seems to be difficult for MOF to smoothly play the role as the chief negotiator and coordinator. The failure to activate public and academic involvement is another reason why the negotiators cannot dominate the floor and legitimacy.
There are many internal and external factors which could influence the process and results of an international economic negotiation. But the organizational aspects are arguably most critical. In the case of WTO accession negotiation, the 1998 government restructuring and subsequent new coordination regime instantly enhanced the momentum and efficiency. 38 So it might be the time to restructure the negotiating organization of GPA accession and to take full advantage of the negotiation as an opportunity to set up a transparent, open, and efficient government procurement regime.
